Rural Demography, Public Services and Land Rights in Africa: A Village-Level Analysis in Burkina Faso by Margaret S. McMillan et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RURAL DEMOGRAPHY, PUBLIC SERVICES AND LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA:










We are grateful to the NBER African Successes Project for financial support, and thank Moussa Kabore
and colleagues in the Direction de la Prospective et des Statistiques Agricoles et Alimentaires (DPSAA)
of Burkina Faso for survey implementation, Jose Castillo for research assistance, and Jun Folledo
of IFPRI for GIS calculations.  The paper was much improved by valuable suggestions from Will Dow
and other participants at the Zanzibar Conference of the NBER African Successes Project, August
3-5, 2011, as well as comments from Rohini Pande and Remi Jedwab. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Margaret S. McMillan, William A. Masters, and Harounan Kazianga. All rights reserved.
Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Rural Demography, Public Services and Land Rights in Africa:  ¸˛A Village-Level Analysis
in Burkina Faso
Margaret S. McMillan, William A. Masters, and Harounan Kazianga




This paper uses historical census data from Burkina Faso to characterize local demographic pressures
associated with internal migration into river valleys after Onchocerciasis eradication, combined with
a new survey of village elders to document change over time and differences across villages in local
public goods provision, market institutions and land use rights. We hypothesize that higher local population
densities are associated with more public goods and a transition from open-access to regulated land
use. Controlling for province or village fixed effects, we find that villages’ variance in population
associated with proximity to rivers is closely correlated with higher levels of infrastructure, markets
and individual land rights, as opposed to familial or communal rights.  Responding to population growth
with both improved public services and private property rights is consistent with both scale effects

















Rural Demography, Public Services and Land Rights in Africa:   
A Village-Level Analysis in Burkina Faso  
 
 
Introduction and Motivation 
An unusual factor in Africa’s 20
th-century agricultural development was a relatively low 
initial level of average population density coupled with unusually high rates of rural population 
growth over the last 30 years.  As shown in Figure 1, Africa’s year-to-year rate of rural 
population growth rose above that of Asia around 1975, peaked in 1990, and only recently has 
fallen below the highest levels ever seen in other regions.  All regions have seen a rise and then 
fall in their annual rates of rural population growth, but in the post-1975 period Africa’s growth 
rate rose more recently and reached a higher level for a longer time than that of other regions.  
This paper investigates the link between rural population and the local institutions and 
infrastructure needed for market development in agriculture.  We use spatial differences in 
settlement patterns and migration exposure to test how rural public goods and land-use rights 
have responded to demographic change.  Our central hypothesis is that recent increases in rural 
population densities are associated with a wider spread of rural infrastructure, public services and 
local marketplaces; and a transition from open-access to regulated land use, including stronger 
individual property rights and more reliance on the rule of law to adjudicate disputes.       
Our data come from Burkina Faso, a landlocked West African country of about 13 
million people.  As shown in Figure 1, from 1950 to 2005 Burkina Faso’s rural population 
growth rate rose even more dramatically than that of Africa as a whole, to a peak above 2.5% per 
year.  Burkina’s rural population growth rate is projected to decline rapidly in the coming 
decades, but will remain well above zero until the absolute size of the urban population becomes 
large enough for the annual growth of towns and cities to absorb each year’s increase in the 
country’s entire population.  Figure 1 shows that rapid growth in Burkina Faso’s rural population 
was not uniform in time, with a temporary reversal in the 1980s that may have been associated 
with migration to Cote d’Ivoire or other factors, followed by a burst of catch-up growth and 
downward projections until urbanization is sufficient to achieve zero rural population growth 
around 2050.   3 
 
Historically, Burkina Faso has had large movements of rural people to its own cities and 
a large migration to coastal Cote d’Ivoire after colonization.  A large number of those migrants 
later returned, including many who were forcibly repatriated following civil unrest in Cote 
d’Ivoire starting in the late 1990s.  In addition, the donor-funded Onchocerciasis Control 
Program quickly eradicated river blindness starting in the 1970s, leading to large population 
movements into river valleys.  These demographic shocks affected villages across Burkina Faso 
in different ways depending on their location, creating unusual variance in subsequent rural 
population density with which to study the impact of rural demography on local institutions and 
infrastructural investments. 
We hypothesize that changes in rural population growth change the payoffs from 
collective action, making it relatively more urgent to develop market infrastructure and 
institutions.  This hypothesis follows Boserup (1965), who argued that rising rural population 
densities create incentives not only for farm-level adoption of more input-intensive techniques 
and “induced invention” of new technologies in response to factor scarcity as suggested by Hicks 
(1932), but also induced institutional changes to allocate newly-scarce natural resources more 
efficiently.  A link between rural population density and rural public goods could also be due to 
political pressures or indivisibilities and scale effects in the provision of infrastructure and 
institutions. Both relative-price and scale effects could be subject to time lags, leading rural 
population growth to have a Malthusian effect in the short run, even as it facilitates the 
institutional and technological innovations needed for later agricultural productivity growth. 
Modern analyses of how population density and factor scarcity affect agricultural 
development were pioneered by Hayami and Ruttan (1971) for the U.S. and Japan, and tested in 
a large subsequent literature such as Olmstead and Rhode (1993).  Only a few of these papers 
(e.g. Lin 1995) focus on the emergence and adoption of institutions; most ask how institutions 
affect technology adoption, such as Kazianga and Masters (2002, 2006).  Focusing on rural 
demography also expands on our other previous work regarding the role of environmental factors 
in economic growth (Masters and McMillan 2001) and African policy choices (McMillan 2001, 
McMillan and Masters 2003).  Here, we use within-country variation in village size and access to 
public services, infrastructure and property rights, to test how the public sector has responded to 
rural demographic change.   4 
 
Our focus on the specific challenge of rural population growth for agricultural 
development follows Johnston and Kilby (1975) among others.  Most of the development 
economics literature concerned with demography has focused either on demographic transition 
in the population as a whole (including the demographic “drag” or “dividend” from age structure 
emphasized by Bloom and Williamson, 1998), or the structural transformation from farm to 
nonfarm employment in terms of output and employment shares (including the “growth bonus” 
associated with shifting from a low productivity to a high productivity sector as in Temple, 
2005).  Focusing on demographic conditions within rural areas addresses a distinctive aspect of 
Africa’s post-independence economic decline, and grounds for optimism about the future as rural 
infrastructure and institutions adapt to higher levels of population density and the speed of 
further demographic change slows down.  
The motivation for our approach begins with an economic view of rural demography.  
Simple accounting ensures that each locality’s rural population growth is its natural increase 
(births minus deaths, which in turn are determined by age structure as well as age-specific 
mortality and fertility), plus or minus each year’s net migration to urban or other rural areas.  
From an economic point of view, however, both fertility and migration are choice variables, and 
mortality may also be influenced by investment in health.  Given this endogeneity, identification 
of a potentially causal effect of demography requires an exogenous shock to rural population size 
that occurs with sufficient speed and magnitude to induce a measurable societal response.   
Our study design takes advantage of Burkina Faso’s unusual demographic history, which 
includes two large waves of exogenous migration into specific rural areas from the 1970s.  One 
wave flowed southwest out of the Central Plateau towards rivers in the Volta Valley, where it 
converged with another wave returning from Cote d’Ivoire.  We use three rounds of census data 
in 1985, 1996 and 2006 to capture the resulting variation in village population, and compare that 
to variance in institutions and infrastructure as recalled by focus group interviews of village 
elders.   
Our work contributes to an important gap in the literature on institutions and economic 
development identified by Pande and Udry (2006) who argue that “the research agenda identified 
by the institutions and growth literature is best furthered by the analysis of much more micro-
data than has typically been the norm in this literature.” Specifically, we study both spatial and 5 
 
temporal variation in rural public services and property rights, focusing on diversity across 
villages in a setting with wide variation in exposure to clearly exogenous demographic shocks.  
The closest antecedent is probably Grimm and Klasen (2008), who test for endogenous adoption 
of land titles at the village level on Sulawesi in Indonesia.  Our surveys include land rights and 
also consider a very wide range of other institutions, public services, and infrastructure used for 
market exchange.  Methodologically, our use of focus groups to obtain village-level recall data 
on the location and availability of public services and land rights follows Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo (2004), building on a long tradition of participatory surveys in rural areas (e.g. Chambers 
1994).  This approach allows us to ask about many different types of public services as seen from 
the villagers’ point of view. 
This paper aims only to demonstrate the value of villagers’ recall data in establishing 
stylized facts about how rural public services and land rights vary across space and time.  In 
future work, this type of data could also be used to analyze causal effects of public services and 
institutions on economic outcomes. For example, Besley (1995) and others have found evidence 
that institutions significantly affect investment outcomes in rural Africa; Pande and Udry (2006) 
provide a summary of these studies.  In Burkina Faso, Kazianga and Masters (2002) found that 
stronger cropland tenure was associated with more intensive soil and water conservation.  Our 
approach to changes in village-level infrastructure and institutions is also relevant to the 
mechanisms by which large-scale public health interventions influence economic development, 
as in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Bleakley (2007) and Cutler et al. (2010). 
   In the next section, we describe the major exogenous population shifts that might permit 
identification of how changes in rural demography affect public goods provision. We then turn to 
our empirical strategy and a description of our data. In section four we present and discuss our 
results. Section five concludes. 
 
Historical Background  
  Since independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has experienced two major policy-induced 
changes in settlement patterns. The first began in 1974 when the Onchocerciasis Control 
Program (OCP) was launched by the World Bank to control river blindness in seven West 
African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Togo. The 6 
 
second occurred from the late 1990s until 2002 when up to one million Burkinabe returned from 
Cote d’Ivoire to escape violence and a suspension of immigrants’ rights in that country. Since 
our ability to draw a causal link between population growth and institutional change hinges on 
these two events, we describe them in more detail below. 
The OCP is widely considered to be among the most successful public health programs 
ever launched in Sub-Saharan Africa. Onchocerciasis, or “river blindness”, is primarily a rural 
disease that affects Sub-Saharan Africa more than anywhere else in the world. The disease is 
spread through bites from black flies of the genus Simulium, which transmit the larvae of a 
filarial worm, Onchocerca volvulus. The worms multiply only in the human body, where they 
cause debilitating symptoms that include blindness, and are transmitted only by the black fly, 
which lives in proximity to fast-moving rivers. The OCP was a multilateral effort that initially 
covered eleven countries, including Burkina Faso. The program involved weekly aerial treatment 
and ground-level treatment of black fly breeding grounds. Annual drug treatments offered 
immediate relief from the symptoms and elimination of nearly all offspring of the adult worm. 
Figure 2 provides a map of Onchocerciasis prevalence in and around Burkina Faso prior 
to the OCP, and afterwards.  Prevalence rates were recorded at above 60% of surveyed people 
living in the lower Volta River valley before the OCP, which almost completely eradicated the 
disease in target countries but left prevalence rates unchanged in Sierra Leone.  Eradication was 
incomplete in Guinea, Togo and Benin.  Today, the disease is no longer considered a threat in the 
original control zone, which has consequently attracted in-migration from other rural areas.   
  Anticipating in-migration to newly attractive river valleys, the government of Burkina 
Faso created a special national agency—the Volta Valley Authority (AVV)—and gave the 
agency control of 75% of the targeted river basins. Figure 3 shows these locations, and the 
“planned” villages to which it provided financial and institutional support. However, the pace of 
spontaneous settlement soon outgrew the ability of the AVV to finance and create sufficient 
numbers of sponsored settlements. As a result, there were sizable intra- and interregional 
migration flows as documented by McMillan et al. (1992), typically from the drier northeast and 
central plateau to lower altitude river valleys, leading to the actual pattern of inter-regional 
migration illustrated in Figure 4, from McMillan et al. (1993).   7 
 
  Figure 4 documents the pattern of human migration that occurred in the late 1970s and 
1980s. The arrows in the figure originate in the area of out-migration and the direction of 
movement. Dashed arrows indicate net human migration, while solid arrows indicate the path of 
transhumant (seasonal) livestock movements which formed travel corridors for migrants. The 
shading in the figure indicates how heavy the degree of net settlement was by province. This 
pattern of rural-to-rural migration reflected the economic opportunities opened up by river 
blindness control in the lower parts of the Volta River valleys, relative to the extreme poverty 
experienced in high density, higher-altitude areas with less disease pressure prior to the OCP.  
Figure 5 illustrates how, during colonial times, population had accumulated upstream in the 
Central Plateau, leaving the downstream segments of the three Volta River valleys with 
extremely low population densities.  Some of population movement towards these downstream 
river valleys was planned as part of the OCP, but by 1983 more than 80 percent of the increase in 
cultivated land in Burkina’s river basins could be attributed to spontaneous settlers (McMillan et 
al, 1993).  
Also notable and of particular importance for our study is the fact that the lower parts of 
the Volta River valleys that attracted heavy in-migration are relatively accessible from Cote 
d’Ivoire. The domestic migration triggered by the OCP was therefore compounded by 
repatriation of migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, who converged on the same newly habitable 
provinces in southern Burkina Faso. Some of this return migration from Cote d’Ivoire could have 
happened as early as the mid-1980s due to changes in cocoa prices that made migration to Cote 
d’Ivoire less profitable than it once had been. Repatriation then accelerated sharply in the 1990s 
due to political changes in Cote d’Ivoire. After the death of the autocratic ruler Felix Houphet-
Boigny in 1993, his successor Henri Konan Bedie introduced the concept of “Ivorian-ness” in 
1995, allegedly to deny Ivorian citizenship to his main political rival, Alassane Ouattara, thereby 
excluding him from office. Bedie insisted that Ouattara, a Muslim from the north of the country, 
was Burkinabe. Subsequently, attacks on people of foreign descent became increasingly 
widespread (Human Rights Watch 2001). By that time, more than one quarter of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
population consisted of immigrants who had arrived since independence, of whom the 
overwhelming majority had come from Burkina Faso. As shown in Figure 6, the Cote d’Ivoire 
census of 1998 identified about 2.25 million Burkinabe living in Cote d’Ivoire, which was close 8 
 
to 20% of Burkina’s total population at that time. Four decades of peace and stability in Cote 
d’Ivoire came to an abrupt end on December 24, 1999, when the military, under the leadership of 
General Robert Guei, overthrew the elected government of Konan Bedie in the country’s first 
coup d’￩tat. Although the coup was ostensibly prompted by soldiers’ unhappiness over pay and 
conditions, it soon became apparent that, like Bedie, General Guei was also ready to incite ethnic 
and religious rivalries in order to remove political opposition. Continuing the theme of “Ivorian-
ness”, Guei introduced even stricter eligibility requirements for the 2000 presidential elections, 
once again excluding Alassane Ouattara on the basis of his alleged links with Burkina Faso. 
  Though exact numbers are difficult to come by, it is estimated that between 1999 and 
2002 hundreds of thousands of Burkinabe were repatriated as a result of political unrest and 
worsening economic conditions in Cote d’Ivoire. They returned by rail, road, and on footpaths. 
Because of a lack of data, it is impossible to determine exactly where all of these emigrants 
decided to settle. But it is unlikely that many of them went back to the same impoverished 
Central Plateau they had originally fled. Much more likely is that these emigrants settled in the 
OCP river basins closer to Cote d’Ivoire, as suggested by McMillan et al. (1993).   
 
Empirical Strategy, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
Our evidence on village-level access to public services, infrastructure and institutions 
comes from a novel survey conducted for this project by the Burkina Faso Office of Agricultural 
Statistics in January through June 2010.  This survey asked groups of village elders to discuss 
and describe the history of the facilities around them, recording the date of any changes in the 
distance to each kind of facility and any changes in property-rights arrangements.  From those 
underlying observations, we construct a time-varying index of the village’s proximity to public 
services, public infrastructure, religious services, and markets, as well as time-varying indicators 
of property rights over land.  We combine these indexes with population estimates for each 
village from the Burkina Faso national censuses of 1986, 1996, and 2006 to test whether cross-
sectional and time-series variance in population size can help explain variance in the provision of 
public services, infrastructure, market institutions and property rights.  To help identify a causal 
effect of demographic change on our outcome variables, we use the exogenous pressures on 
population described in the previous section. 9 
 
The survey instrument is provided in the appendix. It was administered by experienced 
enumerators employed for Burkina’s annual agricultural survey, the structure of which is 
designed to accommodate new survey modules. The enumerators began by assembling a focus 
group of village elders and officials who were asked a series of detailed questions regarding 
various types of public services, infrastructure, and institutions available to them.  For each type 
of public-sector amenity, we asked how far villagers had to travel to reach the nearest point of 
service, at present and in previous years, along with the date of any change. The section on 
property rights did the same for institutions, for example by posing the following question: Can 
land be sold in your village? If the group agrees that the answer to this question is yes, the 
interviewer then asks: since when could land be sold in your village? Questions posed in this 
way allow us to construct time varying indexes over multiple amenities from the point of view of 
the villagers themselves.  Our results focus on two kinds of variables:  travel distances to public 
services or infrastructure, and categorical indicators of land use rights, both as reported for each 
census year. 
The travel distances to collective amenities are grouped into four categories:  (1) Public 
Services and Utilities, defined as the administrative office used to register births, any savings and 
loan facility, any fixed-line telephone, or any mobile phone reception; (2) Public Infrastructure, 
defined as a road that is accessible by truck all year, a road accessible by truck seasonally, a bus 
stop, a primary school, a secondary school, or a health center; (3) Religious Services, defined as 
any church, mosque, or temple; and (4) Markets, defined as any market with storage facilities, 
any livestock market, or a private shop.  These are all the distances for which our group-
interview technique elicited unambiguous agreement in at least 700 of the 730 villages.  Other 
questions, such as distance to water wells, bridges and electricity supplies, elicit agreement less 
often, perhaps because those amenities are less salient to villagers’ lives or their use is more 
varied among the respondents.  The distances to collective amenities were then aggregated in 
each of three ways. First, we consider the distance one must travel to have access to all the 
services in a given category, i.e. the distance associated with the farthest one.  Second, we 
consider the average distance to all of the services in the group, i.e. the arithmetic mean of each 
distance.  Finally, we consider the distance to any of the listed services, i.e. the minimum 
distance among them.   10 
 
Categorical indicators of land rights address three kinds of land use.  First, we ask 
whether use rights over crop land are undefined or held by individuals, families, or the 
community. Then we ask whether cropland had ever been rented or sold, which we take to 
indicate the presence of a land market.  Finally, we ask whether villagers recognize a formal 
authority that regulates access to pasture land, forests and potentially cropped land.   
Our sample of villages consists of 747 sites that had previously been selected by the 
Office of Agricultural Statistics for their nationally representative agricultural survey conducted 
annually since the early 1990s.  In this context, villages are very small, averaging about 1,500 
people. Their boundaries can change somewhat from decade to decade, as some households enter 
or split off to form new settlements associated with the village.  Our final dataset consists of 730 
villages whose recorded names are the same across the three censuses and our new survey, at a 
correctly recorded GIS location.  We use year and region fixed effects for each of Burkina’s 45 
provinces in order to focus on spatial variation across villages within relatively small 
administrative units, as well as village fixed effects to control for time-invariant village 
characteristics not included in our dataset.  
Table 1 presents the proportion of all observations with each category of property right, 
as reconstructed for the census years of 1985, 1996 and 2006.  For example, rights over cropland 
are not defined in 14.4 percent of village-year observations, implying a complete absence of rule 
of law over this resource. Ten percent of observations involved cropland rights controlled by 
communal authorities, almost 60 percent had cropland rights held by families, and almost 16 
percent reported cropland rights held by individuals.  Descriptive statistics on all variables as 
used in the regressions are provided in Table 2, separately for each year to reveal the time trends.  
Public services become more closely available and property rights are more tightly regulated in 
more recent years.  Also, note that the average population of all surveyed villages grows from 
1985 to 1996, but then falls in 2006.  There is likely to have been systematic undercounting of 
the rural population in 2006, which is why the Burkina government is planning a new census 
several years ahead of its decennial schedule.   
To overcome endogeneity between a village’s amenities and its population size, we 
instrument the village’s population by its straight-line distance to any river from which 
Onchocerciasis could have been eradicated. We expect distance to the river to be inversely 11 
 
correlated with population size in all survey years (1985, 1996 and 2006), as households moved 
into the river valleys after 1974.  To account for time-varying migration and population growth 
as well as differences in enumeration and the quality of each census, we interact distance to river 
with period dummies to allow for differential effects over time. The advantage of using this 
instrument to proxy for demographic factors associated with river blindness control is that it is 
“clean”, and not influenced in any way by administrative boundaries or ex-post classifications 
that might drive correlations with infrastructure, public services or land use. This strategy does 
have some disadvantages, of course: distance to rivers may turn out to be a weak instrument for 
population size, and it may not be valid to exclude distance to river from our main regression if 
infrastructure, public services and land rights are correlated with distance to rivers independently 
of its influence on population size. As a result, we may not be able to interpret our estimated 
coefficients on instrumented population as a causal effect of population change alone.  The 
coefficients and significance levels, even in our IV regressions, remain correlations that could 
confound the effects of population size with other features of proximity to rivers that might repel 
or attract people and also influence infrastructure, public services and land rights.  
One way to test the degree to which exogenous OCP treatment made river valleys newly 
attractive to people, and whether the resulting demographic change was associated with any 
political response in terms of infrastructure, public services and land rights, is to split the sample 
into treatment and placebo regions.  Inside treatment regions, the OCP made village locations 
nearer river valleys newly attractive after 1974.  In the placebo regions, the relative attractiveness 
of proximity to rivers did not change.  To demarcate the OCP-treated regions shown in Figures 2, 
3 and 4, we use the province boundaries shown in Figure 4 around the shaded, migrant-receiving 
areas.  These provinces contained land that became newly attractive over time, presumably 
because the black flies that transmit Onchocerciasis were eliminated after 1974.  
The empirical strategy we use results in a set of two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions, asking whether demographic changes associated with the attractiveness of a 
village’s proximity to rivers are correlated with the spread of rural public services, infrastructure, 
and market institutions serving that village.  Our paper does not identify the mechanism by 
which more populated villages might obtain more rural public services, infrastructure, or market 
institutions: instead, our goal is to test whether our new type of data can reveal an informative 12 
 
relationship, exploiting an unusual natural experiment in the relative attractiveness of village 
locations across Burkina Faso. 
 
Estimating Equations and Results 
Our estimation begins with a set of descriptive OLS regressions showing the correlations 
between village-level population and public infrastructure or institutions, controlling for year and 
province fixed effects, using the following specification:  
 
 
where I is our measure of infrastructure or institution of type k serving village j at time t from the 
survey data, and P is our measure of the total population in village j at year t from the census 
data, and   are time dummies.  X controls for province fixed effects, and in robustness tests also 
controls for the ethnic composition of village population. Our hypothesis is that that β>0, as 
larger populations facilitate the provision of public goods and market institutions, due either to 
relative scarcities as in Boserup (1965) or to indivisibilities at the relevant scale of population 
size.  
  Estimates of regression (1) are shown in table 3, where X controls only for province fixed 
effects.  Columns 1-12 all concern the presence of public services.  In columns 1-4 the dependent 
variable is the maximum distance one must travel to have access to all amenities in each 
category. In columns 5-8, the dependent variable is the average distance one must travel to 
access any amenity in each category, and in columns 9-12 the dependent variable is the 
minimum distance one must travel to access at least one of them. Both the distances and village 
population are expressed in natural logs, so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
We find that larger villages have closer amenities in 11 of the 12 regressions; the one exception 
is column (2), where only the time trend is significant.   
  Columns 13-19 refer to land rights.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if our 
respondents report that this type of land-use rights is used in the village, and 0 otherwise. 
Because our model contains province or village fixed effects, we estimate the relationship 
between population and land rights using a linear probability model. Coefficients can be 
interpreted as the change in the probability that a certain type of land right exists when the 
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natural log of population increases by 1. In a larger village, land ownership is less likely to be 
familial (as opposed to individual or communal), but the more important correlation is with the 
presence of land market transactions: having a larger village population by 1 log point is 
associated with a 1.9% higher probability of having had land transactions.  
  Table 4 repeats the diagnostic OLS regression with additional controls for the number of 
land chiefs who participated in the group interview, as well as the number of ethnic groups and 
number of clans reported to be present in the village, as a crude approximation of the village’s 
social fragmentation which might influence political cooperation and collective action for public 
goods provision (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). The correlation between population size and 
access to public goods is usually but not always robust to these controls.  Estimated coefficients 
on population size are somewhat smaller when controlling for ethnic diversity and number of 
land chiefs, but contrary to some hypotheses the more diverse villages actually have more public 
infrastructure than the less diverse ones.  In the absence of any clear identification strategy 
regarding fragmentation, however, for this paper we focus on the main relationship concerning 
total population size. 
   Finding significant coefficients in these OLS regressions is not surprising, as people 
could choose to locate in villages with closer access to public institutions and services, or both 
could be caused by something else. To overcome endogeneity, we use instrumental variables for 
population, so that the only variation in village population used in our second stage regression 
will be associated with distance to rivers and changes over time.  
  The first stage regression of our 2SLS system is specified as follows:  
 
                                                                                     ( ) 
 
where R is the log of geographic distance to the nearest river in village j, T are year dummies for 
1996 and 2006, and M is controls imposed through province or village fixed effects.  When using 
the resulting predicted village populations, the coefficient estimate from equation (1) could be 
interpreted as a causal effect of population size only if a village’s distance to rivers had no other 
channel of influence on the provision of public services and land rights.  Our goal in this paper is 
simply to test whether such a link exists; if so, the mechanism could be addressed in future work.  14 
 
  Any correlation between a village’s population and its distance to rivers might vary over 
time, so the first stage regression includes time dummies and interaction terms. The OCP started 
in 1974 and our observations are in 1985, 1996 and 2006, so we expect that distance to rivers 
might be most important for population in the earlier years. We also expect that distance to rivers 
might matter more in the regions where OCP had been active, so we divide the sample between 
villages in the treatment provinces and villages in placebo regions where this shock did not 
occur. 
  First stage results are shown in Table 5.  Columns 1-3 use province fixed effects, for the 
country as a whole and then for the placebo and treatment regions only. Columns 4-6 do the 
same using village fixed effects. The point estimates in row one indicate that villages further 
from rivers are significantly smaller: a one percent increase in travel time to a river reduces 
village population size by 0.247 percent. The magnitude of this effect is roughly twice as large 
for villages in the Volta Valley region as it is for villages outside this region. The interaction 
terms in rows 4 and 5 indicate that the influence of distance to river on population size did not 
diminish significantly between 1985 and 1996 and thus the difference between treatment and 
control group persists. In 2006, however, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
significant for the entire sample and is driven by the treatment group.  Taken together, the point 
estimates on distance to river of -0.312 and distance to river interacted with the year dummy for 
2006 of +0.27 imply that in 2006, a one percent increase in the distance to a river reduces the 
population size by 0.047 percent in the treatment villages. This result is consistent with our 
expectation that the size of the effect would diminish over time.  Beneath each column, we 
provide an F-statistic on the joint significance of all instruments.  The null hypothesis that the 
instruments are jointly irrelevant in the regression can be rejected at the one-percent level for all 
cases. Additionally, the F-statistics meet the rule of thumb cut-off suggested by Stock and Yogo 
(2005) in five of six cases (all but the last column), which is an indication of the explanatory 
power of our instruments.  
Tables 6.1-6.6 report our instrumental variable (IV) estimates, using the same sequence 
of regressions as shown in Table 3 using OLS.  Below each column of Table 6, we report the 
2SLS regression’s Hansen J statistic and the associated p-value. The p-values are generally well 15 
 
above 0.10 indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term in most instances.  
It is notable that the IV coefficients on village population are generally larger and more 
significant than the OLS estimates in Table 3. A potential explanation is that the OLS estimates 
reflect the average population effect on the outcomes variables (e.g Card 1995, 2001). On the 
other hand, the IV estimates reflect the effect of population in villages where the instruments 
induced population changes (Imbens and Angrist 1994).    
Table 6.1 shows our basic result with province fixed effects, for the entire country.  
Variation in a village’s population associated with proximity to rivers is positively associated 
with having more public services, infrastructure, religious facilities, and markets, as well as more 
individual land rights (as opposed to familial or communal), more land rental or sale 
transactions, and regulated access to forest land.  The only unexpected coefficient is in column 
19, showing less regulated access to crop land, but that is only weakly significant and arises in 
the context of column 13 indicating rights are more likely to be vested in individuals than in 
families or communal authorities.   
Table 6.2 shows the same regression with village fixed effects. Coefficients for public 
services, religious facilities, and land regulations are no longer significant, but the coefficients on 
infrastructure, markets, individual land rights and land markets remain large and significant. 
These amenities show the strongest link to village population changes over this 20-year time 
period, controlling for common national time trends and any time-invariant characteristics of the 
villages other than their population.  
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the corresponding pair of results for the Volta Valley region 
only, first with province and then with village fixed effects.  Here coefficients are generally 
larger, but significance levels are sometimes smaller perhaps due to the smaller sample size. 
With village fixed effects, two of the three infrastructure variables and also individual land 
ownership rights and land markets remain significantly linked to instrumented population size. 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the relevant results for the villages outside our treatment region.  
This is a type of placebo regression, although in this case we do not expect the link between 
population and public services to disappear entirely.  Indeed in these non-treatment villages, the 
coefficients on instrumented population remain significant for religious facilities and a few other 16 
 
amenities when using province fixed effects, although even these become insignificant when 
village fixed effects are used.  
So far, we have shown that variance in village population is robustly correlated with the 
provision of local public services, private markets and individual property rights. The link is 
particularly clear when instrumenting population by proximity to rivers, especially within the 
Volta Valley where the OCP shock occurred.  This correlation between village population and 
public amenities could be driven by various possible mechanisms to be investigated in future 
work,  including  scale  economies  in  the  public  sector  and  the  relative  scarcity  of  natural 
resources. 
Whatever mechanisms are involved, the magnitude by which larger villages obtain more 
public services and also have more access to private markets and individual land rights is 
economically significant.  The order of magnitude can be described by comparison to the time 
trends sweeping Burkina Faso as a whole, driven by national policy and other changes.  The 
point estimates of elasticities reported in Table 6.1 give us the effect of a 1% increase in village 
population, which we can compare to the effect of time associated with our dummy variables for 
1996 and 2006.  For example, using column 2 for proximity to every item of public infrastructure 
(including the farthest), villages that are one percent larger in terms of population size have 
infrastructure that is 0.32 percent closer. In contrast, the time trend for new infrastructure 
projects improved their proximity by 16 percent and 74 percent from 1985 to 1996 and 2006 
respectively.  Over a 10 year period, village population is likely to increase by much more than 
one percent. For example, using the average rural population growth rate of 2 percent, village 
population would increase by 25 percent.  The implied reduction in travel distance to public 
infrastructure is 0.32*25 or 8 percent. Alternatively, a doubling of village size is roughly 
equivalent to a decade or two of time trend for most of the variables we consider. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper uses variance in rural demography associated with proximity to rivers in Burkina 
Faso to test whether villages with larger populations obtain closer provision of public services, 
public infrastructure, religious facilities and markets, and have more market-oriented property 
rights over land use.  Our data on infrastructure and institutions come from a new survey of 17 
 
village elders, which was designed to document change over time and differences across 
villages. We find strong links between larger rural population, more local public goods provision 
and individual property rights, controlling for either province or village fixed effects and time 
trends.  
  One feature of our study is to demonstrate the use of village elders’ recall data in 
constructing time-varying indexes of local infrastructure and institutions.  This involves asking 
about villagers’ access to specific amenities, and then aggregating those responses into indexes 
that capture variation in public amenities from their point of view.  The correlations we find 
demonstrate the potential significance of this approach as a way to overcome the limited 
availability of other ways to measure variation in public services, infrastructure, and institutions 
over time and space.   
  In the particular setting of rural Burkina Faso, we find that variance in village population 
size is significantly correlated with village-level access to infrastructure, markets and individual 
land rights.  These public amenities are clearly of great importance for rural development.  
Future work using our data or similar new surveys elsewhere could document further how village 
infrastructure and institutions are responding to Africa’s extraordinary demographic changes, 
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Figure 1.  Past and projected rural population growth, by region and country (1950-2050) 
Panel A:  Regional aggregates 
 
 
Panel B:  Burkina Faso 
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Figure 2.  Estimated Onchocerciasis Prevalence in West Africa 
 
 
Panel (a):  Prior to control (1974)  Panel (b):  After control (2002) 
Source: WHO, Onchocerciasis Control Programme (www.who.int/apoc/onchocerciasis/ocp). 22 
 
Figure 3.  Location of Planned Settlements Associated with Onchocerciasis Control, 1973-1984 
 
Source:  Della E. McMillan, Jean-Baptiste Nana and Kimseyinga Savadogo, “Settlement and Development 
in the River Blindness Control Zone.” World Bank Technical Paper No. 200, Series on River Blindness Control in West Africa.  





Figure 4. Patterns of Agricultural Migration in Burkina Faso 
Source:  Della E. McMillan, Jean-Baptiste Nana and Kimseyinga Savadogo, “Settlement and 
Development in the River Blindness Control Zone.” World Bank Technical Paper No. 200, Series 
on River Blindness Control in West Africa.  Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993.   24 
 
 




Source: University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, from U.S. Central 



















Figure 6: Foreign Population in Cote d’Ivoire by Nationality, 1998 Census 
 




Figure 7: Location of Surveyed Villages and Rivers Used for IV Estimation  
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  Village locations are drawn from authors’ survey data; river locations and paths from villages to rivers are 
calculated from IFPRI file data.  Roads and travel paths are shown for illustration purposes only; data used for hypothesis tests are straight-
line distances from the village to the closest river, and travel distance to nearest point in Cote d’Ivoire (at the lower-left of the map shown).27 
 
 






Rights over crop land    
  Not defined   14.4 
  Communal   10.0 
  Familial   59.9 
  Individual   15.7 
Existence of sales or rental of crop land   
  None  92.4 
  At least one sale or rental has occurred  7.7 
Role of traditional authorities in solving crop land conflict   
  None  63.8 
  Some  36.2 
Role of elected authorities involved in solving crop land conflict   
  None  81.9 
  Some  18.1 
Demarcation and regulation of pasture land   
  No delimited pasture land  71.7 
  Pasture land delimited, access not regulated  22.9 
  Pasture land delimited, access regulated by tax or quota  5.4 
Demarcation and regulation of forest land   
  No delimited forest land  70.1 
  Forest land delimited, access not regulated  15.9 
  Forest land delimited, access regulated by tax or quota  14.0 
 
Source for all tables:  Authors’ calculations.   
Notes:  Results shown are from village elders’ response to questions asked in local languages, 
translated by local enumerators from the French questionnaire reproduced in the appendix to this 
paper.  Items shown are from questionnaire sections VIII (for crop land), IX (for pasture land) and 
X (for forest land).   
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Table 2: Mean and standard deviations for all variables 
 
Proximity of farthest source (km) 
(Distance to farthest site in each set) 
  Proximity to all sources (km) 
(Average distance to all services) 
  Proximity to closest source (km) 







Services  Markets  





Services  Markets  





Services  Markets  
1985  35.348  35.458  9.274  12.832    26.915  14.662  6.321  8.585    18.351  3.566  3.536  4.855 
  [1.206]   [1.239]   [0.518]   [0.790]     [0.779]   [0.482]   [0.360]   [0.432]     [0.607]   [0.308]   [0.299]   [0.269]  
1996  35.635  28.053  7.465  12.735    25.055  11.532  4.726  7.811    15.115  1.817  2.328  3.788 
  [1.137]   [0.977]   [0.409]   [0.741]     [0.708]   [0.374]   [0.267]   [0.384]     [0.533]   [0.209]   [0.230]   [0.251]  
2006  32.151  20.955  5.218  11.455    19.681  8.099  3.036  6.11    8.596  0.501  1.16  1.975 
   [1.005]   [0.771]   [0.331]   [0.611]      [0.543]   [0.278]   [0.194]   [0.276]      [0.415]   [0.083]   [0.138]   [0.176]  
                           Distance (km) to: 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access to land for:     Population  Nearest   
 Year  Individual  Familial  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop     ‘(1000s)    river   
1985  0.41  0.665  0.1  0.056  0.152  1.353  2.75    1.6    65.986   
  [0.018]   [0.018]   [0.011]   [0.009]   [0.013]   [0.024]  [0.033]     [0.058]     [1.782]    
1996  0.423  0.671  0.099  0.064  0.186  1.44  2.751    1.682    66.876   
  [0.019]   [0.018]   [0.011]   [0.009]   [0.015]   [0.027]  [0.034]     [0.059]     [1.818]    
2006  0.453  0.669  0.104  0.107  0.24  1.516  2.786    1.396    66.336   
   [0.018]   [0.017]   [0.011]   [0.011]   [0.016]   [0.029]  [0.033]      [0.091]      [1.777]    
 
Notes:  Standard deviations in brackets. Proximity measures refer to travel distances from the village to reach the closest site offering one 
or more of each set of collective resources:  Public Services and Utilities (defined as the administrative office used to register births, any 
savings and loan facility, any fixed-line telephone, any mobile phone reception); Public Infrastructure (defined as a road that is accessible 
by truck all year, a road accessible by truck seasonally, a bus stop, a primary school, a secondary school, and a health center), Religious 
Services (any church, mosque or temple), and Markets (any open-air food market, livestock market, or private shop).  Specific wording of 
each question is reproduced in the appendix; from the questionnaire as a whole, we retained only those proximity questions which more 
than 700 of the 730 villages were unable to answer unambiguously.  Population is computed from the Burkina Faso national censuses for 
1985, 1996 and 2006.  Distances to nearest river are straight lines calculated from latitude and longitude geocodes. 
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Table 3: OLS regression results for public infrastructure and institutions on village-level population  
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km)   
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)   
Population  0.064***  0.013  0.226***  0.211***  0.067***  0.070***  0.217***  0.234***  0.128***  0.154***  0.187***  0.316***   
  [0.024]  [0.025]  [0.031]  [0.032]  [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.026]  [0.028]  [0.031]  [0.020]  [0.023]  [0.024]   
Y=1996  -0.064  0.175***  0.125*  -0.015  0.016  0.187***  0.161***  0.043  0.177***  0.290***  0.210***  0.185***   
  [0.054]  [0.055]  [0.069]  [0.072]  [0.048]  [0.046]  [0.060]  [0.062]  [0.058]  [0.052]  [0.055]  [0.058]   
Y=2006  0.040  0.487***  0.509***  0.085  0.261***  0.539***  0.526***  0.238***  1.093***  0..595***  0.486***  0.640***   
  [0.051]  [0.055]  [0.068]  [0.071]  [0.046]  [0.041]  [0.058]  [0.061]  [0.065]  [0.046]  [0.052]  [0.055]   
Constant  -3.643***  -3.261***  -3.175***  -3.275***  -3.477***  -2.907***  -2.878***  -3.248***  -3.428***  -1.793***  -2.066*** 
-
3.283***   
  [0.164]  [0.174]  [0.219]  [0.225]  [0.144]  [0.142]  [0.189]  [0.194]  [0.208]  [0.147]  [0.175]  [0.175]   
                           
Observ.  2,040  2,068  1,960  2,043  2,040  2,068  1,960  2,043  2,040  2,068  1,960  2,043   
R-squared  0.005  0.039  0.051  0.022  0.022  0.069  0.069  0.041  0.146  0.096  0.070  0.121   
 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
lnpopulation   0.114  -0.043***  0.008  0.019***  0.019   0.033  -0.030 
  (0.062)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.027)  (0.021) 
year==1996  0.012  0.010  -0.003  0.007  0.030  0.089**  -0.003 
  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.037)  (0.047) 
year==2006  0.037  -0.004  0.006  0.056***  0.085***  0.152***  0.031 
  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.047) 
Constant  0.511***  0.973***  0.043  -0.077*  0.088  1.584***  2.765*** 
  (0.083)  (0.078)  (0.053)  (0.039)  (0.062)  (0.119)  (0.150) 
               
Observations  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076 
R-squared  0.002  0.007  0.001  0.012  0.008  0.010  0.000 
 
    Notes:  Population and distance measures are in logs, with proximity defined as its additive inverse (-log[distance]), so that coefficients 
can be read as elasticities and a positive coefficient implies closer facilities.  The regression also controls for 45 province dummies (not 
shown).  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   30 
 
 
Table 4: OLS regression results for public infrastructure and institutions on village-level population and diversity  
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km)   
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)   
Population 
0.057**  0.022  0.177***  0.183***  0.057**  0.065***  0.176***  0.208***  0.097***  0.143***  0.169***  0.297***   
(0.026)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.025)   
# of land chiefs  
-0.004  -0.018**  0.016*  0.046***  -0.004  0.002  0.016**  0.043***  0.018  0.018***  0.020***  0.027***   
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)   
# of ethnic groups 
0.024**  0.015  0.048***  0.010  0.029***  0.029***  0.043***  0.020*  0.055***  0.026***  0.035***  0.040***   
(0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.008)   
# of clans  
0.001  -0.004  0.016***  0.018***  0.002  -0.001  0.013***  0.016***  0.008**  0.007***  0.005***  0.013***   
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)   
year==  1996 
-0.072  0.184***  0.139*  -0.008  0.012  0.198***  0.171***  0.048  0.188***  0.285***  0.208***  0.189***   
(0.057)  (0.057)  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.061)   
year==  2006 
0.027  0.516***  0.527***  0.070  0.250***  0.560***  0.536***  0.230***  1.061***  0.592***  0.477***  0.663***   
(0.053)  (0.057)  (0.071)  (0.076)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.061)  (0.064)  (0.068)  (0.048)  (0.055)  (0.057)   
Constant 
-3.705***  -3.344***  -3.193***  -3.372***  -3.552***  -3.009***  -2.902***  -3.372***  -3.551***  -1.901***  -2.156***  -3.472***   
(0.174)  (0.185)  (0.228)  (0.236)  (0.152)  (0.150)  (0.197)  (0.202)  (0.217)  (0.153)  (0.185)  (0.179)   
Observations  1,810  1,835  1,728  1,813  1,810  1,835  1,728  1,813  1,810  1,835  1,728  1,813   
R-squared  0.013  0.048  0.094  0.048  0.036  0.087  0.109  0.075  0.170  0.120  0.092  0.170   
 
Notes:  Population and distance measures are in logs, with proximity defined as its additive inverse (-log[distance]), so that coefficients can 
be read as elasticities and a positive coefficient implies closer facilities.  The regression also controls for 45 province dummies (not shown).  
Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 4 (continued) 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  Markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
                      
Population  0.020  -0.051***  0.003  0.020***  0.013  -0.046**  -0.033 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
# of land chiefs   0.011***  0.011***  -0.003*  -0.006**  0.004  -0.022***  0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
# of ethnic groups  0.004  -0.011***  0.005*  0.013***  -0.008***  0.014**  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
# of clans   -0.007***  0.006***  0.003***  -0.004***  -0.001  0.006***  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
year==  1996  0.018  0.011  -0.003  0.006  0.030  0.091**  0.002 
  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.039)  (0.049) 
year==  2006  0.042  -0.009  0.005  0.052***  0.086***  0.153***  0.033 
  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.041)  (0.049) 
Constant  0.527***  1.001***  0.040  -0.077*  0.103  1.593***  2.823*** 
  (0.088)  (0.082)  (0.058)  (0.041)  (0.066)  (0.127)  (0.158) 
Observations  1,843  1,843  1,843  1,843  1,843  1,843  1,843 
R-squared  0.022  0.026  0.019  0.039  0.013  0.026  0.001 
 
Notes:  The regression also controls for 45 province dummies (not shown).  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate 
significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 5: First stage regression results for IV estimation 














                    
log distance to 
river  -0.247***  -0.183***  -0.312***       
  [0.041]  [0.057]  [0.059]       
year==1996  -0.111  -0.324  0.030  -0.165  -0.297  -0.089 
  [0.244]  [0.368]  [0.330]  [0.231]  [0.373]  [0.293] 
year==2006  -0.896***  -0.687*  -1.107***  -0.916***  -0.733*  -1.109*** 
  [0.242]  [0.369]  [0.324]  [0.255]  [0.411]  [0.324] 
distanceX1996  0.053  0.082  0.038  0.066  0.077  0.067 
  [0.060]  [0.088]  [0.084]  [0.057]  [0.089]  [0.075] 
distanceX2006  0.174***  0.079  0.265***  0.179***  0.090  0.267*** 
  [0.060]  [0.089]  [0.082]  [0.063]  [0.099]  [0.082] 
Constant  7.942***  7.885***  8.023***  6.975***  7.160***  6.815*** 
  [0.164]  [0.236]  [0.230]  [0.029]  [0.038]  [0.043] 
             
Observations  2,076  959  1,117  2,076  959  1,117 
R-squared  0.189  0.143  0.217  0.489  0.452  0.513 
F-Stat Inst  19.20  10.82  11.79  12.44  10.67  6.602 
Notes: Dependent variable for all columns is log of village population size; columns 1-3 control for 45 province dummies (not shown), and 
columns 4-6 control for village fixed effects (so distance to river is dropped). Distance measures are in logs. Distance to nearest river is 
straight-line distance, to capture flight time needed by the black flies that carry Onchocerciasis from the river to peoples’ homes. Robust 
standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.33 
 
Table 6.1: IV regression results for infrastructure and institutions on predicted village population, with province fixed effects 
 
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km) 
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
lnpopulation  0.273*  0.320*  1.026***  0.665***  0.390**  0.696***  0.912***  0.735***  0.973***  0.697***  0.594***  0.959*** 
  [0.163]  [0.172]  [0.194]  [0.223]  [0.152]  [0.160]  [0.167]  [0.197]  [0.219]  [0.160]  [0.143]  [0.182] 
year==1996  -0.082  0.150***  0.059  -0.065  -0.013  0.135**  0.108*  -0.008  0.101  0.247***  0.190***  0.128** 
  [0.056]  [0.056]  [0.072]  [0.070]  [0.051]  [0.053]  [0.062]  [0.062]  [0.070]  [0.054]  [0.055]  [0.062] 
year==2006  0.083  0.556***  0.715***  0.184**  0.332***  0.681***  0.712***  0.350***  1.281***  0.719***  0.614***  0.789*** 
  [0.058]  [0.064]  [0.092]  [0.085]  [0.055]  [0.062]  [0.079]  [0.076]  [0.085]  [0.065]  [0.066]  [0.077] 
                         
Observations  2,040  2,068  1,960  2,043  2,040  2,068  1,960  2,043  2,040  2,068  1,960  2,043 
Number of prov  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
Hansen J stat.  2.067  8.224  5.624  0.0629  3.947  8.279  4.655  0.0820  7.047  2.193  1.064  1.062 
Prob HJS  0.356  0.0164  0.0601  0.969  0.139  0.0159  0.0975  0.960  0.0295  0.334  0.587  0.588 
 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
lnpopulation  0.119**  -0.150**  0.074  0.081**  0.224***  0.113  -0.078* 
  [0.051]  [0.064]  [0.046]  [0.032]  [0.071]  [0.106]  [0.341] 
year==1996  0.006  0.019  -0.007  0.002  0.013  0.073**  0.028 
  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.016]  [0.011]  [0.022]  [0.035]  [0.043] 
year==2006  0.066**  -0.028  0.020  0.069***  0.133***  0.185***  -0.031 
  [0.027]  [0.026]  [0.018]  [0.014]  [0.025]  [0.041]  [0.048] 
               
Observations  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076 
Number of prov  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
Hansen J stat.  0.456  1.503  1.204  2.274  3.042  1.008  0.965 
Prob HJS  0.796  0.472  0.548  0.321  0.218  0.604  0.617 
Notes:  First stage results are shown in Column 3 of Table 5.  Population and proximity measures are in logs.  All regressions control for 45 
province dummies (not shown).  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6.2: IV regression results for infrastructure and institutions on predicted village population, with village fixed effects 
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km) 
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
lnpopulation  0.106   0.777**  0.103  0.701**  0.300  0.387  0.025  0.564**  0.491  0.980**  0.191  0.556*** 
  [0.292]  [0.398]  [0.267]  [0.337]  [0.247]  [0.252]  [0.218]  [0.272]  [0.378]  [0.402]  [0.207]  [0.201] 
year==1996  -0.035  0.273***  0.144***  -0.070  0.069*  0.252***  0.182***  0.005  0.264***  0.237***  0.240***  0.159*** 
  [0.045]  [0.063]  [0.044]  [0.053]  [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.036]  [0.043]  [0.057]  [0.061]  [0.035]  [0.046] 
year==2006  -0.001  0.317***  0.411***  0.196**  0.189***  0.446***  0.479***  0.316***  0.984***  0.794***  0.525***  0.712*** 
  [0.061]  [0.094]  [0.079]  [0.084]  [0.055]  [0.057]  [0.065]  [0.067]  [0.089]  [0.107]  [0.066]  [0.080] 
                         
Observations  2,027  2,066  1,936  2,033  2,027  2,066  1,936  2,033  2,027  2,066  1,936  2,033 
Number of vfe  692  704  670  694  692  704  670  694  692  704  670  694 
Hansen J stat.  1.524  0.00170  0.0243  0.00699  0.920  0.0217  0.0223  0.0152  0.0416  0.766  0.0732  0.0348 
Prob HJS  0.217  0.967  0.876  0.933  0.337  0.883  0.881  0.902  0.838  0.382  0.787  0.852 
 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
lnpopulation  0.053**  0.005  -0.023*  0.044**  -0.034  -0.125  -0.034 
  [0.025]  [0.020]  [0.014]  [0.022]  [0.067]  [0.130]  [0.072] 
year==1996  0.015**  0.004  0.003  0.012  0.033***  0.101***  0.013 
  [0.007]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.008]  [0.010]  [0.020]  [0.012] 
year==2006  0.052***  0.007  0.001  0.041***  0.075***  0.136***  0.023 
  [0.015]  [0.005]  [0.002]  [0.013]  [0.017]  [0.031]  [0.016] 
               
Observations  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076  2,076 
Number of vfe  705  705  705  705  705  705  705 
Hansen J stat.  1.793  0.0201  0.210  0.0298  0.596  0.00628  0.786 
Prob HJS  0.181  0.887  0.647  0.863  0.440  0.937  0.375 
    Notes:  First stage results are shown in Column 1 of Table 5.  Population and proximity measures are in logs.  All regressions control for village 
fixed effects.  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6.3: IV regression results for infrastructure and institutions on village population, with province fixed effects, in Volta Valley only 
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km) 
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
lnpopulation  0.406**  0.396**  0.653***  0.667***  0.478***  0.704***  0.633***  0.759***  0.979***  0.816***  0.532***  1.167*** 
  [0.181]  [0.196]  [0.193]  [0.247]  [0.166]  [0.171]  [0.169]  [0.220]  [0.229]  [0.160]  [0.161]  [0.209] 
year==1996  -0.143*  0.165*  0.058  -0.113  -0.071  0.109  0.123  -0.054  0.029  0.158**  0.234***  0.054 
  [0.083]  [0.086]  [0.098]  [0.104]  [0.077]  [0.079]  [0.086]  [0.094]  [0.104]  [0.078]  [0.081]  [0.100] 
year==2006  0.073  0.574***  0.613***  0.137  0.303***  0.619***  0.656***  0.305***  1.172***  0.560***  0.634***  0.737*** 
  [0.074]  [0.082]  [0.102]  [0.097]  [0.069]  [0.078]  [0.089]  [0.089]  [0.106]  [0.077]  [0.077]  [0.101] 
                         
Observations  1,103  1,114  1,044  1,107  1,103  1,114  1,044  1,107  1,103  1,114  1,044  1,107 
Number of prov  23  23  23  23  23  ,23  23  23  23  23  23  23 
Hansen J stat.  2.734  9.640  10.30  1.568  5.298  10.49  10.03  2.028  5.429  1.923  4.974  1.330 
Prob HJS  0.255  0.00807  0.00579  0.457  0.0707  0.00527  0.00665  0.363  0.0662  0.382  0.0832  0.514 
 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
lnpopulation  0.226***  -0.044  0.053  0.026***  0.233***  0.073  -0.080 
  [0.080]  [0.064]  [0.053]  [0.012]  [0.069]  [0.121]  [0.104] 
year==1996  -0.016  0.014  -0.014  0.005  0.005  0.092*  0.035 
  [0.035]  [0.031]  [0.025]  [0.013]  [0.032]  [0.052]  [0.055] 
year==2006  0.076**  0.003  0.007  0.053***  0.119***  0.192***  0.060 
  [0.034]  [0.029]  [0.023]  [0.014]  [0.030]  [0.050]  [0.053] 
               
Observations  1,117  1,117  1,117  1,117  1,117  1,117  1,117 
Number of prov  23  23  23  23  23  23  23 
Hansen J stat.  2.158  0.307  0.906  1.542  4.172  0.825  0.0377 
Prob HJS  0.340  0.858  0.636  0.463  0.124  0.662  0.981 
Notes:  First stage results are shown in Column 2 of Table 5.  Population and proximity measures are in logs.  All regressions control for 45 
province dummies (not shown).  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6.4: IV regression results for infrastructure and institutions on village population, with village fixed effects, in Volta Valley only 
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km) 
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
lnpopulation  -0.171  0.629**  -0.337  0.197  -0.292  -0.294  -0.174  0.268  0.004  0.741***  0.055  0.753** 
  [0.267]  [0.312]  [0.278]  [0.208]  [0.217]  [0.198]  [0.225]  [0.187]  [0.278]  [0.272]  [0.203]  [0.302] 
year==1996  -0.048  0.352***  0.181**  -0.037  0.060  0.289***  0.226***  0.024  0.206***  0.181***  0.308***  0.127* 
  [0.067]  [0.087]  [0.073]  [0.057]  [0.055]  [0.054]  [0.059]  [0.051]  [0.069]  [0.069]  [0.055]  [0.076] 
year==2006  0.019  0.490***  0.433***  0.094**  0.238***  0.537***  0.516***  0.262***  1.098***  0.553***  0.569***  0.711*** 
  [0.052]  [0.068]  [0.077]  [0.045]  [0.047]  [0.040]  [0.064]  [0.040]  [0.065]  [0.073]  [0.060]  [0.076] 
                         
Observations  1,096  1,113  1,032  1,102  1,096  1,113  1,032  1,102  1,096  1,113  1,032  1,102 
Number of vfe  374  380  358  376  374  380  358  376  374  380  358  376 
Hansen J stat.  0.753  0.508  0.000555  1.304  0.258  1.105  0.0108  1.473  0.706  1.515  0.303  0.123 
Prob HJS  0.386  0.476  0.981  0.253  0.612  0.293  0.917  0.225  0.401  0.218  0.582  0.725 
 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
lnpopulation  0.048**  0.005  -0.013  0.043***  0.012  -0.097  -0.058 
  [0.026]  [0.021]  [0.009]  [0.018]  [0.059]  [0.120]  [0.084] 
year==1996  0.018  0.007  0.002  0.012  0.040***  0.122***  0.031 
  [0.013]  [0.005]  [0.003]  [0.011]  [0.015]  [0.031]  [0.022] 
year==2006  0.062***  0.008*  0.004  0.046***  0.100***  0.180***  0.060*** 
  [0.013]  [0.005]  [0.003]  [0.010]  [0.015]  [0.027]  [0.020] 
               
Observations  1,116  1,116  1,116  1,116  1,116  1,116  1,116 
Number of vfe  380  380  380  380  380  380  380 
Hansen J stat.  1.209  0.0574  0.333  0.220  2.118  0.0483  0.648 
Prob HJS  0.271  0.811  0.564  0.639  0.146  0.826  0.421 
 Notes:  First stage results for this regression are not shown. Population and proximity measures are in logs.  All results control for 
village fixed effects.  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 37 
 
Table 6.5: IV regression results for infrastructure and institutions on village population, with province fixed effects, outside Volta Valley 
(Placebo regression) 
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km) 
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
lnpopulation  -0.085  0.136  1.600***  0.317  0.123  0.609*  1.312***  0.413  0.996**  0.313  0.576**  0.413 
  [0.307]  [0.316]  [0.474]  [0.430]  [0.281]  [0.317]  [0.389]  [0.366]  [0.473]  [0.336]  [0.265]  [0.322] 
year==1996  -0.039  0.114  0.119  -0.015  0.038  0.162**  0.135  0.037  0.186**  0.323***  0.149**  0.165** 
  [0.073]  [0.071]  [0.116]  [0.092]  [0.065]  [0.065]  [0.095]  [0.079]  [0.094]  [0.073]  [0.072]  [0.076] 
year==2006  -0.025  0.472***  0.984***  0.098  0.275**  0.720***  0.879***  0.273  1.421***  0.770***  0.574***  0.652*** 
  [0.129]  [0.141]  [0.224]  [0.199]  [0.118]  [0.139]  [0.186]  [0.169]  [0.199]  [0.149]  [0.131]  [0.148] 
                         
Observations  937  954  916  936  937  954  916  936  937  954  916  936 
Number of prov  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22 
Hansen J stat.  1.285  1.696  0.379  2.857  1.093  0.882  0.444  1.538  2.559  1.703  0.810  1.014 
Prob HJS  0.526  0.428  0.827  0.240  0.579  0.643  0.801  0.463  0.278  0.427  0.667  0.602 
 
Notes:  First stage results for this regression are not shown. Population and proximity measures are in logs.  All regressions control 
for 45 province dummies (not shown).  Robust standard errors in brackets, and asterisks indicate significance levels at *** p<0.01, ** 38 
 
Table 6.6: IV regression results for infrastructure and institutions on village population, with village fixed effects, outside Volta Valley 
(Placebo regression) 
  Proximity of farthest source (km)  Proximity to all sources (km)  Proximity to closest source (km) 
  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets  Services  Infrastr.  Religion  Markets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
lnpopulation  0.443  -0.405  0.739  1.341  0.007  -0.146  0.753  0.779  -2.033  1.375  0.695  -0.298 
  [1.059]  [0.963]  [1.018]  [1.281]  [0.741]  [0.670]  [0.931]  [0.806]  [2.518]  [1.522]  [0.867]  [0.661] 
year==1996  -0.014  0.152***  0.135**  -0.017  0.073*  0.192***  0.160***  0.037  0.254*  0.350***  0.183***  0.169*** 
  [0.055]  [0.057]  [0.066]  [0.089]  [0.039]  [0.038]  [0.058]  [0.056]  [0.137]  [0.091]  [0.057]  [0.046] 
year==2006  0.173  0.272  0.669*  0.520  0.244  0.442*  0.684*  0.437  0.323  1.211**  0.646*  0.397 
  [0.379]  [0.364]  [0.388]  [0.494]  [0.264]  [0.253]  [0.353]  [0.311]  [0.897]  [0.587]  [0.330]  [0.261] 
                         
Observations  931  953  904  931  931  953  904  931  931  953  904  931 
Number of vfe  318  324  312  318  318  324  312  318  318  324  312  318 
Hansen J stat.  0.231  1.142  0.375  1.551  0.698  1.144  0.366  1.814  0.319  0.00481  0.148  0.0415 
Prob HJS  0.631  0.285  0.540  0.213  0.403  0.285  0.545  0.178  0.572  0.945  0.701  0.839 
 
  Land ownership rights  Land  Regulated access 
  Individual  Family  Communal  markets  Pasture  Forest  Crop Land 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
lnpopulation  0.098  0.002  -0.047  -0.063  -0.187  -0.108  0.087 
  [0.136]  [0.003]  [0.055]  [0.123]  [0.247]  [0.308]  [0.104] 
year==1996  0.012  -0.000  0.002  0.011  0.017  0.072***  -0.004 
  [0.008]  [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.009]  [0.015]  [0.020]  [0.006] 
year==2006  0.056  0.004  -0.011  0.029  -0.009  0.093  0.024 
  [0.053]  [0.004]  [0.019]  [0.047]  [0.091]  [0.115]  [0.036] 
               
Observations  959  959  959  959  959  959  959 
Number of vfe  325  325  325  325  325  325  325 
Hansen J stat.  0.189  0.414  0.237  0.0314  0.0564  0.0991  0.192 
Prob HJS  0.664  0.520  0.626  0.859  0.812  0.753  0.661 
Notes:  First stage results for this regression are not shown. Population and proximity measures are in logs.  All results control for 





Minist￨re de l’Agriculture de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques 
 
DIRECTION GENERALE DE LA PROMOTION DE L’ECONOMIE RURALE 
 




Nº  El￩ments d’identification  Nom  Code 
1  Région    |____|____| 
2  Province    |____|____| 
3  Commune    |____|____| 
4 
Type de localité 
1 = urbain 
2 = rural 
  |____| 
5  Village / secteur     |____|____|____| 
6  Latitude 
    |____|____|____|____|____|____| 
7  Longitude     |____|____|____|____|____|____| 
 
 
Nom du contrôleur : ___________________________________________________|__C__|____|____| 
 
Date de l’interview : |____|____|   |____|____|   |____|____| 
                                 Jour              mois            année 
 
Nom et visa du superviseur :___________________________________ 
 
Date de contrôle : |____|____|   |____|____|   |____|____| 
                                Jour              mois              année 
Résultat du contrôle :………………………………………………………..…|____| 
    (1= aucun problème ; 2= questionnaire corrigé ; 3= questionnaire repris) 
Nom et pr￩nom(s) de l’agent de saisie A :________________________________|____|____|____| 
 
Nom et pr￩nom(s) de l’agent de saisie B :_________________________________|____|____|____| 
 
A combien d’ann￩es remonte l’￩tablissement du village :….. |____|____|____|____| 
 
Le Village est-il un village de colonie : (1=Oui ;  0=Non) :…………………….  |____|   40 
 
I.  IDENTITE DES REPONDANTS 
 
N°  Catégorie  Nombre pour chaque 
catégorie 
TOTAL* 
Homme   Femme  
I.1  Autorités 
gouvernementales/Représentants de 
l’administration 
|____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
I.2  Chefs de village  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
I.3  Délégués CVD  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
I.4  Chefs de terre  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
I.5  Chefs religieux (Imam, Pasteur, Pr￪tre….)  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
I.6  Responsables de 
Groupements/Associations 
|____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
I.7  TOTAL*  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____| 
*  A compl￩ter apr￨s l’interview avec le groupe 
   
 
II. COMPOSITION ACTUELLE DES COMMUNAUTES DU VILLAGE 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse  
II.1  Nombre approximatif d’autochtones revenus de la Côte 
d’Ivoire à cause de la crise ivoirienne 
|____|____|____|____| 
II.2  Nombre approximatif d’immigrants venant d’ailleurs  |____|____|____|____| 
II.3  Nombre de groupes ethniques dans la communauté  du 
village 
|____|____| 
II.4  Nombre de clans dans le village  |____|____| 
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III. POPULATION DU VILLAGE  
 
NB : Pour cette partie, l’enqu￪teur devra se rendre ￠ la pr￩fecture ou ￠ la mairie de la localit￩ 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse  
III.1  Existence  des documents du recensement de 2006   
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
|____| 
III.2  Population totale en 2006  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.3 




III.4  Femme  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.5 




III.6  Femme  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.7  Existence des documents du recensement de 1996 
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
|____| 
III.8  Population totale en 1996  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.9 




III.10  Femme  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.11 




III.12  Femme  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.13  Existence des documents du recensement de 1985   
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
|____| 
III.14  Population totale en 1985  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.15 




III.16  Femme  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
III.17 




III.18  Femme  
|____|____|____|____|____|____| 
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IV.VISITE D’UN OFFICIEL DE LA VULGARISATION AGRICOLE   
 
N°  Questions   Réponse  
IV.1  Quand a ￩t￩ la premi￨re visite d’un vulgarisateur à votre 
communauté ?                                     (Inscrire l’année ou xxxx 
si jamais) 
|____|____|____|____| 
IV.2  Quand est-ce que  la vulgarisation de proximité (ancienne 
formule)  a cessé ?                      (Inscrire l’année ou xxxx si 
jamais) 
|____|____|____|____| 
IV.3  Quand est-ce que la vulgarisation nouvelle  formule a 
commencé? (Inscrire l’année ou xxxx si jamais)  |____|____|____|____| 
IV.4  Quand a ￩t￩ la derni￨re visite d’un vulgarisateur à votre 
communauté ? (Inscrire l’année ou xxxx si jamais)  |____|____|____|____| 
IV.5  Combien de visites avez vous reçus au cours des 12 derniers 
mois ? (Inscrire l’année ou xxxx si jamais)  |____|____|____|____| 
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V.  INFRASTRUCTURES CENTRALES : DISTANCES ET CHANGEMENTS 
 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse 
Distance  (en km)  Année 
d’￩tablissement 
V.1  Distance entre le village et l’administration centrale (pour les registres des 
naissances) 
   V.1.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.1.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.1.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
V.2  Distance entre le village et la route praticable par car ou camion toute l’ann￩e 
   V.2.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.2.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.2.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
V.3  Distance entre le village et la route praticable par car ou camion seulement une 
partie de l’ann￩e 
 
   V.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.3.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.3.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
V.4  Distance entre le village et l’arr￪t d’autocar/taxi brousse rural 
   V.4.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.4.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.4.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
V.5  Distance entre le village et le bureau des caisses populaires 
   V.5.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.5.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.5.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 44 
 
V.6  Distance entre le village et la localité avec distribution d’￩lectricit￩ 
   V.6.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.6.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.6.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
V.7  Distance entre le village et la localité avec  le téléphone fixe 
   V.7.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.7.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.7.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
V.8  Distance entre le village et la localité avec la téléphonie mobile 
   V.8.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.8.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   V.8.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
 





N°  Questions   Réponse 
VI.1  FREQUENCE  DU MARCHE GENERAL 
    Distance  (en 
km) 
Fréquence 
1=  chaque jour 
2 = tous les 3 jours 
3 = tous les 4 jours 
4 = chaque semaine 
5 = occasionnel  
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   
VI.1.1 
La situation 
actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.1.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.1.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.2 
TYPE DE SOURCE POUR ACCES A L’EAU DANS LE MARCHE GENERAL 
    Type de source 
d’eau 
1=  robinet 
2 = borne fontaine 
3 = forage 
4 = puits 
5 = aucune 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   
VI.2.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.2.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.2.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.3 
HANGARS DANS LE MARCHE  GENERAL 
    Type de hangar 
1=  individuel 
2 = collectif 
3 = aucun 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   
VI.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.3.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.3.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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VI.4 
ACCES A L’ELECTRICITE DANS LE MARCHE GENERAL 
    Disponibilité  
1=  permanente 
2 = une partie de la journée 
3 = aucune 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   
VI.4.1  La situation actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.4.2  La situation précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.4.3  La situation antécédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.5 
FRAIS (NIVEAU DES TAXES DE MARCHE GENERAL)  
    Période  
1=  chaque jour 
2 = chaque semaine 
3 = chaque mois 
4 = chaque année 
5 = chaque marché 
Montant par période  Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   
VI.5.1 
La situation 
actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.5.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.5.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.6  FREQUENCE  DU MARCHE A BETAIL 
    Distance  (en 
km) 
Fréquence 
1=  chaque jour 
2 = tous les 3 jours 
3 = tous les 4 jours 
4 = chaque semaine 
5 = occasionnel 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
VI.6.1  La situation 
actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.6.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.6.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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VI.7  TYPE DE SOURCE POUR ACCES A L’EAU DANS LE MARCHE A BETAIL 
 
    Type de source 
d’eau 
1=  robinet 
2 = borne fontaine 
3 = forage 
4 = puits 
5 = aucune 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   
VI.7.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.7.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VI.7.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.8  HANGARS DANS LE MARCHE A BETAIL 
    Type de hangar 
1=  individuel 
2 = collectif 
3 = aucun 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
VI.8.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.8.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.8.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.9  ACCES A L’ELECTRICITE DANS LE MARCHE A BETAIL 
    Disponibilité  
1=  permanente 
2 = une partie de la journée 
3 = aucune 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
VI.9.1  La situation actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.9.2  La situation précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.9.3  La situation antécédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.10  FRAIS (NIVEAU DES TAXES DE MARCHE) A BETAIL 
    Période  
1=  chaque jour 
2 = chaque semaine 
3 = chaque mois 
4 = chaque année 
5 = chaque marché 
Montant par période  Année 
d’￩tablissement 
VI.10.1  La situation 
actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.10.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VI.10.3  La situation 





VII.INFRASTRUCTURE DU VILLAGE 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse 
    Distance  Nombre   Année 
d’￩tablissement 
VII.1  Distance entre le village et les boutiques pour achat des provisions divers (sel, 
thé, sucre, etc.) 
   
VII.1.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.1.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.1.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VII.2  Distance entre le village et les puits collectifs pour l’eau potable  
 
   
VII.2.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.2.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.2.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VII.3  Distance entre le village et le puits à grand diamètre 
   
VII.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.3.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.3.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VII.4  Distance entre le village et le forage collectif pour l’eau potable 
   
VII.4.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.4.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.4.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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VII.5  Distance entre le village et le Barrage collectif 
   
VII.5.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.5.2 
La situation 
précédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VII.5.3 
La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VII.6  Pont routier construit par le village 
   
VII.6.1  La situation actuelle 
 
|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VII.7  Passage piétonnier construit par le village 
   
VII.7.1  La situation actuelle 
 
|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VII.8  Magasin  (utilisable) de coop￩rative agricole, d’ONG ou de Groupement  
Villageois 
 
   
VII.8.1  La situation actuelle 
 
|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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VIII. DROITS FONCIERS SUR LES TERRES DE CULTURE 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse 
VIII.1  Type de droit appliquée pour les terres de culture 
(si la réponse est non, mettre des croix ￠ année de début d’application) 
    Type de droit 
appliquée  
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.1.1  Propriété individuelle   |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.1.2  Propriété collective-familiale  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.1.3  Propriété collective-communautaire  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.2  Location, vente et prêts de terres de culture 
(si la réponse est non, mettre des croix ￠ année de début d’application) 
    Possibilité de 
transaction 
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.2.1  Est-ce que la terre peut-être louée ?  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.2.2  Est-ce que la terre peut-être vendue ?   |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.2.3  Est-ce que la terre peut-être prêtée ?  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.3  Est-ce qu’il y a des terres de culture qui ont ￩t￩s lou￩es ? 
(si non à la question VIII.2.1, mettre des croix dans les bacs et passer à la question suivante) 
    Location de terre   
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.3.1  Louées à une personne autochtone   |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.3.2  Louées à une personne étrangère  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.4  A qui devrait-on demander permission pour louer ses terres? 




1=  chef de famille 
2= chef de terre 
3 = conseil élu par la 
communauté 
4 = conseil élu par le 
gouvernement 
5 = aucune permission 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.4.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.4.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.4.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.5  Est-ce qu’il y a des terres de culture qui ont ￩t￩s vendues ? 
(si non à la question VIII.2.2, mettre des croix dans les bacs et passer à la question suivante) 51 
 
    Ventes de terre 
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.5.1  Vendues  à  une personne 
autochtone ?    |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.5.2  Vendues  à une personne 
étrangère?  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.6  A qui devrait-on demander permission pour vendre ses terres? 




1=  chef de famille 
2= chef de terre 
3 = conseil élu par la 
communauté 
4 = conseil élu par le 
gouvernement 
5 = aucune permission 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.6.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.6.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.6.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.7  Est-ce qu’il y a des terres de culture qui ont ￩t￩s pr￪t￩es ? 
(si non à la question VIII.2.3, mettre des croix dans les bacs et passer à la question suivante) 
    Prêts de terre 
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.7.1  Prêtées à une personne autochtone     |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.7.2  Prêtées à une personne étrangère 
  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.8  A qui devrait-on demander permission pour prêter ses terres? 




1=  chef de famille 
2= chef de terre 
3 = conseil élu par la 
communauté 
4 = conseil élu par le 
gouvernement 
5 = aucune permission 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.8.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.8.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.8.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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1=  chef de terre 
2 = chef ou conseil élu par la 
communauté 
3 = chef ou conseil nommé par le 
gouvernement 
4 = autre type d’autorité 
5 = aucune autorité 
Année de début 
d’application 
   VIII.9.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.9.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   VIII.9.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.10  Quelles sont les modes de propriété des terres de pâturages dans cette communauté 




1=  propriété individuelle 
2 = propriété collective-familiale 
3 = propriété collective-lignagère 
4 = propriété collective-
communautaire 
5 = autre 
Année de début 
d’application 
   
VIII.10.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VIII.10.2  La situation précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   
VIII.10.3  La situation antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
VIII.11  Combien de pistes à bétail y a-t-il dans le village 
(s’il n’existe pas de pistes ￠ bétail, mettre des croix dans les bacs et passer ￠ la question suivante) 
    Nombre   Année de début 
d’application 
VIII.11.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
 VIII.11.2  La situation précédente  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
 VIII.11.3  La situation antécédente  |____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
 




IX.DROITS FONCIERS POUR LES TERRES DE PATURAGE 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse 
IX.1  Existe-t-il des terres  réservées pour le pâturage ?    






(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   IX.1.1  La situation actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.1.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.1.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
IX.2  Quelles sont les voies d’acc￨s aux p￢turages ? 
(si la réponse est 2 (tout autre piste), mettre des croix ￠ année d’établissement) 
   IX.2.1   
Voies d’acc￨s 
1=  pistes à bétail  




   IX.2.2  La situation actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.2.3  La situation 
précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
  La situation 
antécédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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IX.3  Quels moyens existent pour limiter l’acc￨s aux terres de 
pâturages ? 
(si la réponse est non pour une situation donnée à la question IX.1, mettre des croix dans 





1=  paiement d’une taxe par 
animal 
2 = paiement d’un autre type 
de taxe 
 3 = contrôle du nombre 
d’animaux 
4 = accès illimité pour 
autochtones 
5= accès illimité pour 
résidents 
6= aucune restriction 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   IX.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.3.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.3.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





1= chef de terre 
2 = chef ou conseil élu par la 
communauté 
3 = chef ou conseil nommé 
par le gouvernement 
4 = autre type d’autorité 
5 = aucune autorité 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   IX.4.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.4.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   IX.4.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
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X.DROITS D’UTILISATION DES FORETS (POUR LE BOIS, LES FRUITS, LA CHASSE ETC.) 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse 
X.1  Existe-t-il des forêts dans votre communauté ?    
(si la réponse est non pour une situation donnée, mettre des croix à année 
d’établissement) 
    Existence de forêts 
(1=Oui ;  0=Non) 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   X.1.1  La situation actuelle  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   X.1.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   X.1.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|  |____|____|____|____| 
X.2  Est-ce qu’il existe des moyens pour limiter l’acc￨s aux forets ? 
(si la réponse est non pour une situation donnée à la question X.1, mettre des croix dans 





1=  paiement d’une taxe par 
unité de bois 
2 = paiement d’une taxe par 
autre moyen 
 3 = contrôle direct des 
entrées et sorties 
4 = accès illimité pour 
autochtones 
5= accès illimité pour 
résidents 
6= aucune restriction 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   X.2.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   X.2.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   X.2.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 





1= chef de terre 
2 = chef ou conseil élu par la 
communauté 
3 = chef ou conseil nommé 
par le gouvernement 
4 = autre type d’autorité 
5 = aucune autorité 
Année 
d’￩tablissement 
   X.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   X.3.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|-|____|-|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   X.3.3  La situation 




XI.INFRASTRUCTURE D’EDUCATION ET DE SANTE 
 
N°  Questions   Réponse 
    Distance  Année 
d’￩tablissement 
XI.1  Distance entre le village et l’￩cole primaire la plus fr￩quent￩e par les 
enfants du village  
   XI.1.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XI.1.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XI.1.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
XI.2  Distance entre le village et l’￩cole secondaire la plus fr￩quent￩e par 
les enfants du village  
   XI.2.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XI.2.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XI.2.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
XI.3  Distance entre le village et le centre de santé le plus fréquenté par la 
population du village 
   XI.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XI.3.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XI.3.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
 




N°  Questions  Réponse 
    Distance  Année 
d’￩tablissement 
XII.1  Distance entre le village et  l’￩glise la plus fr￩quent￩e par la 
population du village  
 
   XII.1.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XII.1.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XII.1.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
XII.2  Distance entre le village et la mosquée la plus fréquentée par la 
population du village  
   XII.2.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XII.2.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
  XII.2.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
XII.3  Distance entre le village et le temple le plus fréquenté par la 
population du village  
   XII.3.1  La situation actuelle  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
   XII.3.2  La situation 
précédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
  XII.3.3  La situation 
antécédente  |____|____|____|  |____|____|____|____| 
 
 
 
 
 
 